Popis produktu

The failure experienced at Gallipoli has become a byword for the misapplication of amphibious operations. In truth, the British experience of joint amphibious operations during the World War was always more than Gallipoli. If success elsewhere seemed elusive, too, then the underlying ability of Britain to execute such operations remains largely undiscussed. The monograph takes the discussion of amphibious operations beyond caricature by examining the genesis and execution of three operations: Tanga, German East Africa; Mesopotamia; and the Dardanelles-Gallipoli campaign and measures the results against the experience and development of amphibious warfare in the immediate prewar period. In short, the work answers the question of the state of British amphibious warfare on the eve of the First World War and the reasons for the failures—and, yes, the successes experienced.British East Africa and Zanzibar stood exposed in 1914, and while doing nothing possessed a certain logic, denying German cruisers the means of resupply mixed with the unsettled temperament of Kenya argued for removing the German threat presented. A tertiary object sought by tertiary British and Indian forces came, saw and was vanquished in short order. As a result, the War Office assumed responsibility for British operations in East Africa from Simla. Though the experience might have served as an object lesson for the campaign about to unfold in Mesopotamia, it did not. There, British arms met with initial success, but soon inadequate means married to unlimited aims told otherwise, culminating in the siege and surrender of the Indian Sixth Division at Kut-al-Amara. In time, the amphibious first entry executed nearly flawlessly became a joint operation anchored on indifferent rivers with memories of the Boxer rebellion and the relief of General Gordon not far removed. Mesopotamia is a reminder that if the enemy gets a vote in war, even more does nature.Beginning as a naval demonstration, the Dardanelles operation morphed into an amphibious landing that never truly became joint when General Sir Hamilton’s forces landed on the Gallipoli peninsula. Eight months later, evacuation of the Allied force beckoned. Operationally, the Allies were stymied, yet strategically the campaign offered a rare instance in the World War where the side operating on the offensive inflicted greater losses on the defender. Patience is rarely offered as a principle of war, but maintenance of the aim implies a degree of patience. Collectively, the case studies presented in British Amphibious Operations of the First World War offer a corrective to our understanding of British joint amphibious operations and the lessons digested—and not.